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Preserving Management Prerogatives 
NORMANHOLMAN 
ABSTRACT 
DRAWINGMOSTLY FROM THE HISTORY of public sector collective bargain- 
ing in Ohio, laws and chronology are examined for insight into the 
importance of management rights and prerogatives. Special attention is 
given to dispute resolution and the respective rights of management and 
labor in it, since the existence of a dispute is likely to reveal an  issue 
where one or the other party may acquire previously undefined 
authority. 
INTRODUCTION 
Collective bargaining, or  its absence, has been governed for years in 
Ohio by the Ferguson Act. The  Ferguson Act was enacted in 1943 in 
direct response to numerous crippling strikes in the private sector 
following World War 11. The law was sweeping and unambiguous. All 
strikes in the public sector were outlawed. The  stated penalties for 
striking public employees were severe; the act provided for termination 
of employment for failure to end illegal strikes. It further provided that 
illegal strikers could not receive increased compensation for one year 
following an  illegal strike and included probation for a like period. 
The  law held firm and intact for many years, but in the 1960s and 
early 1970s public employees in Ohio, as in many other states, began to 
organize and seek representation at the bargaining table. In 1975, decid- 
ing on a case referred to as the Dayton Classroom Teachers Association 
u. Dayton Board of Education, the Ohio Supreme Court held that public 
employees could meet and negotiate binding collective bargaining 
agreements with employers. The court also held, however, that 
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employees have no constitutional right to require their employers to 
bargain collectively. 
In the following years, collective bargaining spread unimpeded to 
most of the public sector employment throughout Ohio. Public librar- 
ies, however, seemed not to have been affected. Perhaps the wealth 
bestowed upon many public libraries by the intangible personal prop- 
erty tax (imposed on stocks and investments) induced satisfaction or 
complacency among library employees. Staff associations, in their roles 
as social organizers and combined with benign advocacy, may have 
participated sufficiently in organizations’ governance. The exception 
was the Public Library of Youngstown and Mahoning County, an 
association library under Ohio laws, which had a collective bargaining 
agreement for years under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Rela- 
tions Board, since a state labor relations authority had not existed until 
the recently enacted Ohio Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act. 
The first drafts of the Ohio Public Employees Collective Bargain- 
ing Act (the act), Chapter 41 17 of the Ohio Revised Code, were consi- 
dered in 1971, a year after the neighboring state of Pennsylvania passed 
its collective bargaining bill. After a 1973 senate defeat and vetoes in 
1975 and 1977 by then Governor James Rhodes, Governor Richard 
Celeste signed the bill into law on July 6, 1983. The act became effective 
on April 1, 1984. 
Ohio became the thirty-ninth state to pass a public sector labor law. 
One might have expected Ohio to be among the first group of states to 
do this because of its extensive labor history in the private sector with 
steelworkers, autoworkers, and the Teamsters. By the time Ohio had 
passed a public sector labor law, the legislature was essentially catching 
u p  with history. Collective bargaining in the public sector in fact had 
been established for years. Among other accomplishments, the act 
created a regulatory body in the form of the State Employment Rela- 
tions Board (SERB). SERB was accorded authority to make rules for 
executing the act, which has not been a small task in light of the large 
amount of public sector collective bargaining that preceded its 
existence. 
The point here is not to list and summarize the act in Ohio but to 
draw from it as a source for discussing bargaining procedures including 
dispute resolution and subjects of bargaining in public libraries. A 
discussion of dispute resolution procedures leads inevitably toa consid- 
eration of strikes in the public sector-who can and who cannot strike- 
and the inclusion of public libraries among those employers where 
strikes are permitted. 
DISPUTE PROCEDURESRESOLUTION 
Bargaining typically is initiated by a notice of at least sixty days 
prior to expiration of an existing contract or the date termination or 
modification of an existing contract is to be effective. Initial negotia- 
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tions must be conducted for a minimum of ninety days, according to the 
Ohio Act, before dispute resolution procedures apply. 
The parties can mutually agree upon dispute resolution proce- 
dures, which would supersede the procedures mandated by the act; that 
is, provided the procedures negotiated lead to final resolution and not 
merely to mediation. If the parties cannot agree to a dispute resolution 
procedure, the one specified in the act will apply. Objectionable to the 
employer in most state mandated impasse procedures is the inclusion of 
fact-finding following mediation. 
In state mandated impasse procedures, Ohio being a typical exam- 
ple, SERB will appoint a mediator to assist the parties in the process of 
collective bargaining. The mediator’s sole function is to reconcile dif- 
ferences between the parties which may take the form of: ( 1 )  settlement 
of the overall agreement; (2)reduction in the number of overall issues; or 
(3) narrowing of the differences on the open issues without completely 
resolving them. The mediator will have only a brief time, fourteen days, 
within which to work magic. If the mediator reports to the state agency 
that impasse still exists, a fact-finding panel will be appointed. 
Fact-finding is a process that requires the parties at a hearing to 
present evidence to a neutral fact-finder supporting their respective 
positions on outstanding issues. Usually the fact-finder must meet with 
both parties’ approval unless the parties cannot agree in which case the 
state agency would select the panel. In some states, such as New York, 
the state agency makes the selection without input from the parties 
(New York Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act, 1985a). 
During fact-finding, each party provides the fact-finder with state- 
ments, probably written, specifying the unresolved issues and the par- 
ties’ position on each. The panel makes final recommendations as to all 
unresolved issues. Either party may reject the fact-finder’s recommenda- 
tions. Since the fact-finder’s recommendations either will be adopted or, 
if not, will have set the stage for a strike or interest arbitration, they are 
not subject to judicial review. 
Specific elements of fact-finding facilitate impasse resolution. Fact- 
finding is a more formal process than either negotiations or mediation 
because the parties must prepare rational arguments supporting their 
positions to submit to the fact-finder at a hearing. The strength or 
weakness of the rationale significantly affects the outcome. Fact-finding 
is effective because i t  may have the power of persuading the parties to 
move from relatively unreasonable positions to the reasonable solutions 
recommended by the fact-finder. Furthermore, weakness in the parties’ 
positions is exposed through cross-examination, presentation of evi-
dence by the other party, and through inquiry by the fact-finder. Fact- 
finding also carries the power of the final step before a strike, which is 
the terminal step in statutory impasse procedures and may impose costs 
that both parties view as unacceptable. 
Voluntary dispute resolution procedures in states where the parties 
14 LIBRARY TRENDS/SUMMER 1989 
have the option of agreeing to them are usually preferred. As stated 
earlier, provided the procedure leads to final resolution, the parties are 
able to forge a method of resolving impasse that suits each party’s 
individual and collective circumstances. Procedures could include: 
(1) conventional arbitration of all unsettled issues, in which case the 
arbitrator is not limited to a choice between the last offers of the parties; 
(2)arbitration limited to a choice between the last offer of each party as 
either single package or on each issue submitted; or (3)any other settle- 
ment procedures agreed to by the parties. The parties may include the 
right to strike except those that are involved in safety-related jobs which 
are usually prohibited from striking. 
Methods involving arbitration probably would be rejected in situa- 
tions where the parties are confident in their abilities to resolve impasse 
on their own and where arbitrarily imposed solutions are unacceptable. 
As an example, Cleveland Public Library, Cleveland, Ohio, and District 
925, Service Employees International Union, during their negotiations 
that began in May 1987, mutually agreed not to follow the dispute 
resolution procedure provided by the Ohio Public Employees Collec- 
tive Bargaining Act and substituted their own procedure as permitted in 
Chapter 41 17 of the Ohio Revised Code. 
During negotiations, the parties expressed or implied that neither 
wanted the delay and cost involved with fact-finding. Furthermore, the 
library bargaining committee did not want publication of the fact- 
finder’s recommendations resulting from fact-finding. Neither the 
library nor District 925 wanted to refer the matter of impasse to a SERB 
appointed mediator, and the Cleveland Public Library in particular did 
not want to have its economic fate, should economic issues be among 
those at impasse, determined by a third party. 
If the parties had followed the procedure available under the stat- 
ute, they could have agreed to resolve the economic impasse by means of 
interest arbitration, and the arbitrator would determine the economic 
issue or issues presented by the parties. For a publicly supported institu- 
tion with a fixed budget, the risks connected with interest arbitration 
outweighed the advantages of following such a procedure. 
Under the Alternative Dispute Resolution between the library and 
District 925 (discussed later), the parties could bargain for as long as five 
months, in contrast to the ninety day period under the statute, prior to 
either party’s having the right to request the Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service to appoint a federal mediator. It is interesting that 
the parties agreed also that an actual impasse did not have to exist for 
either party to request a mediator, rather that “the differences of posi-
tion are so substantial that further negotiations may not produce a 
satisfactory agreement.” “Impasse” suggests deadlock, which may not 
be present in the situation characterized in the procedure. 
ALTERNATIVEDISPUTERESOLUTIONPROCEDURE 
1. The dispute settlement procedure set forth in this agreement shall 
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govern negotiations conducted between the Employer and the Union 
and shall be the agreement of the parties hereto and shall supersede 
the procedures set forth in Ohio Revised Code 4117.14 and related 
sections and regulations. 
2. 	When tentative agreement is reached through negotiations, the ten- 
tative agreement shall be reduced to writing and shall be submitted to 
the Union membership for approval. After approval, the tentative 
agreement will be submitted for approval to the Employer. Each 
negotiating team shall urge and recommend approval of the tenta- 
tive agreement. 
3. 	If either party at any time after midnight (date)determines that the 
differences of position are so substantial that further negotiations 
may not produce a satisfactory agreement, either party may request 
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services (FMCS) to appoint 
a federal mediator for the purpose of assisting the parties in reaching 
an  agreement. 
4. 	If after thirty days from the first meeting with a federal mediator the 
Union believes that negotiations cannot be resolved through the 
procedure outlined earlier, it may engage in a strike upon ten days 
written notice to the Employer and to the State Employment Rela- 
tions Board (Cleveland Public Library District 925. Service 
Employees International Union, 1987, p. 1). 
With due recognition to the time needed to obtain a federal mediator 
and schedule meetings, thirty days from the first meeting between the 
parties with a federal mediator must elapse before the union may engage 
in a strike, and then such a strike must be upon ten days written notice to 
the library and to SERB. The  state mandated dispute resolution, which 
included fact-finding, and the alternative dispute resolution procedure, 
described and outlined earlier, include the union’s right to strike upon 
notice to the employer and SERB in the event the parties fail to reach an  
agreement. Only safety forces in Ohio are not permitted to strike even 
after exhaustion of bargaining, mediation, and fact-finding. All states 
are not the same in their positions on whether public employees have 
the right to strike. In Massachusetts and New York, for example, the law 
prohibits public employees from striking (Annotated Laws of Massa-
chusetts, 1983; New York Public Employees Fair Employment Act, 
198513). In all states that permit public employees to strike, however, 
none seems to include librarians among those prohibited as safety forces 
or otherwise from striking. 
While the arguments pro and con regarding the union’s right to 
strike in the public sector are familiar to many, they bear repeating for 
the benefit of the uninitiated and as a review for the rest: 
Pro: 
1. Public employees are entitled to the same rights accorded private 
employees. 
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2. The right of public employees to engage in collective bargaining is 
meaningless unless supported by some mechanism for clout such as a 
strike. 
3. Strikes are an effective extension of the collective bargaining process, 
do not occur frequently enough to justify their prohibition, and 
generally are not harmful to public health, safety, or welfare. 
Con : 

Public and private sectors are very different and public sector employees 

are therefore not entitled to the same rights accorded private sector 

employees. 

1. Public employees provide unique and essential services. 
2. Private sector market forces are missing from the public sector. 
3. Strikes may damage public health, safety, and welfare. 
Once notification has been given that a strike will occur, the public 
employer is empowered to seek injunctive or court ordered relief. 
Injunctive relief is unequivocal where the strike is illegal, such as 
during pendency of the act’s settlement procedure or during the term of 
the collective bargaining agreement in states where such strikes are 
clearly prohibited by law. Even under circumstances of a legal strike, the 
employer may seek a restraining order while continuing to bargain, 
which would usually be assisted by a mediator. Such restraint on the 
public employees’ right to strike would have to be preceded by the 
finding that a strike may pose clear and present danger to the health or 
safety of the public. 
INTERESTARBITRATION 
In discussing the rationale for an Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Procedure between Cleveland Public Library and District 925, interest 
arbitration was characterized as a risky option to resolve economic 
impasse. In interest arbitration a designated neutral party is used to 
determine future contract terms which will bind the parties who have 
been unable to achieve a new agreement through the bargaining process 
(Elkouri & Elkouri, 1973, pp. 47-50). Interest arbitrators generally pos-
sess liberal authority to formulate the actual employment terms which 
will govern the relationship of parties who have been unable to achieve 
a voluntary agreement themselves (Overton, 1973, pp. 159-66). 
Although interest arbitration-also known as final offer settlement, 
conciliation, or mandatory arbitration-is mandatory for safety forces, 
anyone covered by the act may agree to such a settlement procedure. 
Interest arbitration is conducted by a conciliator who must conduct 
a hearing as soon as practicable. By a given period of time each party 
must submit a written report summarizing the unresolved issues, the 
party’s final offer, and the rationale for that position. The conciliator, 
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in turn, selects, issue-by-issue, the final settlement offer of one of the 
parties. The conciliator by Ohio law cannot suggest a compromise 
position. 
Interest arbitration carries risks for both parties and generates, of 
necessity, serious policy considerations. Interest arbitration may dele- 
gate policy-making authority illegally to an unelected person or board 
that is not designated by the statutes to perform a particular function. 
Boards of Library Trustees for public libraries in Ohio are accorded vast 
powers to set policy for their respective institutions. Specifically men- 
tioned in the Ohio Reuised Code 3375.40 is the authority to “appoint 
and fix” compensation. Economic issues resolved through interest arbi- 
tration appear to circumvent the appropriate authority to set compensa- 
tion and related benefits such as sick leave. Since a conciliator’s 
decisions may impose an untenable economic burden on the library, the 
subsequent adjustments to spending priorities and probable need to 
generate additional revenue also may violate equal protection, since the 
effect would be to shift improperly to a person or board the power to tax. 
There are other arguments less esoteric than apparently constitu- 
tional issues to be leveled against interest arbitration. From the employ- 
er’s vantage point, interest arbitration may result in administrative 
awards of unaffordable wages. From the vantage point of both parties it 
is a risk to have a third party write the contract who is unfamiliar with 
the practicalities of the shared situation. Perhaps of greatest signifi- 
cance, however, is that it damages collective bargaining because the 
parties ultimately fail to bargain. The process does not encourage 
cooperation; rather i t  tends to push the parties apart and separates them 
from their mutual concerns. Only when strikes are prohibited-such as 
for safety forces, and the state must provide a substitute for resolving 
impasses-is interest arbitration desirable. States where collective bar- 
gaining is permitted in the public sector recognize that there should be 
no work stoppages of services that may endanger the health and safety of 
the public. 
MANAGEMENTRIGHTS 
Collective bargaining, by its nature, limits management rights. In 
the place of unimpeded management rights is a contract which restricts 
both parties in the exercise of their respective rights and obligates both 
parties to act in responsible ways. 
As a subject of bargaining, management rights are regarded as both 
mandatory and permissive. Typical mandatory subjects of bargaining 
are wages, hours, other conditions of the contract, and changes in 
existing provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. Management 
rights are mandatory to the extent they affect wages, hours, and terms 
and conditions of employment. Typical permissive subjects of bargain-
ing are the method of recording minutes of bargaining sessions and 
benefits of retirees. To  the extent that there may be areas remaining 
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where management rights can be exercised at all, they are a permissive 
subject and are in the category of those for which only the parties may 
bargain. In many contracts, management rights outside the mandatory 
subjects would be reserved in all areas of responsibility “except where 
otherwise provided.” 
In Ohio, management rights are itemized under the list of permis- 
sive subjects included in the act. These are: 
1. 	Determine matters of inherent managerial policy which include, but 
are not limited to, areas of discretion or policy such as the functions 
and programs of the employer, standards of services, its overall 
budget, utilization of technology, and organization structure; 
2. 	direct, supervise, evaluate, or hire employees; 
3. 	maintain and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of governmen- 
tal operations; 
4. 	determine the overall methods, process, means, or personnel by 
which governmental operations are to be conducted; 
5. 	suspend, discipline, demote, or discharge for just cause, or lay off, 
transfer, assign, schedule, promote, or retain employees; 
6. 	determine the adequacy of the work force; 
7. 	determine the overall mission of the employer as a unit of 
government; 
8. effectively manage the work force; and 
9. take actions to carry out the mission of the employer as a govenmen- 
tal unit (OhioReuised Code, 1987). 
The presence of detail in the act outlining management rights 
suggests that omissions may be deliberate and intended to be restrictive. 
Whether that is true or not, management must establish rights to create 
rules, policies, and practices in areas not mentioned by the act and in 
situations arising during the life of the contract not anticipated by the 
act or the bargained contract. Practically, management must assume 
responsibility in those areas anyway because it will be held accountable 
for resolving the problems such situations may generate. To that end, as 
an addendum to management rights, the following language not found 
in Ohio’s Act would ensure management’s ability to be responsive: 
The exercise of the foregoing rights, and the adoption of reasonable policies, 
rules, and practices in furtherance thereof, shall be limited only by the specific 
terms of this Agreement and pertinent statutes, and then only to the extent 
such specific terms hereof are in conformance with the Constitution and laws 
of the State and of the LJnited States (Cleveland Public Library and District 
925, Service Employees International. Union, 1987, p. 4) 
The exercise of management rights, even those seemingly protected 
by laws and a collective bargaining agreement, evolves reluctantly. 
Acting in the interest of the institution it safeguards, management’s 
good intentions may be thwarted by the legitimate rights of its 
employees. 
Management’s responsibility to act-for example, against drug 
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abuse in the workplace and its right to create policy that establishes a 
drug free environment-must be weighed against employees’ right to 
privacy. The possession, use, and sale of drugs on library premises 
clearly are criminal acts. Employers have a right and responsibility to 
halt criminal activity. T o  protect the rights of all employees to work in a 
hassle-free environment, the employer has a right and responsibility to 
eliminate unruly behavior that accompanies illegal drug abuse. Fur- 
thermore, employees whose skills are impaired by the presence of drugs 
can pose a health and safety threat to themselves, fellow employees, and 
the public. Everyone who is prudent and reasonable should recognize 
the management’s right to prohibit possession, use, and sale of illegal 
drugs in the workplace. 
For the sake of argument, imagine an employer that believes that 
efforts to deter drug use are more effective when detection and therapy 
are available during the early stages of drug use. Such a judgment could 
be made for purely humanitarian reasons, totally lacking in nefarious 
motives, and because there is an interest in identifying and correcting 
individuals’ drug abuse before it is manifested in significant perfor- 
mance shortcomings. Since employees have no right to possess, sell, or 
use illegal drugs in any environment, including the workplace, and 
employers have a legitimate right to prohibit employees’ possession, 
sale, and use of illegal drugs, the employer may have sound reasons to 
conclude that drug testing is an effective means to therapeutic 
intervention. 
The implementation of drug testing would inspire opposition 
from labor advocates and representatives on the grounds that it violates 
employees’ rights to privacy and perpetuates discrimination against the 
handicapped and Title VII discrimination. Furthermore, they would 
argue from the employer’s standpoint that it invites wrongful discharge 
suits. All of that may be true, one argues, but management rights are 
stifled if such a clearly pernicious problem as drug abuse cannot be 
addressed by the rightful party which is management. 
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) recently issued a 
complaint against an employer that unilaterally implemented a drug 
testing program (National Labor Relations Board, 1987). State labor 
relations agencies are likely to fashion similar decisions in their respec- 
tive jurisdictions. In fact, a regulatory agency, such as the NLRB or a 
state board, could require, in a unionized workplace, that the parties 
should meet and bargain in good faith on the subjects of drug testingor 
employee assistance programs (EAP). Because the consideration of these 
policies and practices would constitute the change in a condition of 
employment and the subsequent modification or deletion of an existing 
provision of the collective bargaining agreement, it becomes a manda- 
tory subject of bargaining, and adhering to a claim of management 
rights on the subject of unilateral implementation would be futile. The 
parties must bargain. 
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Employee and management cooperation can be difficult to achieve. 
In many workplaces, joint employee and management committees pro- 
vide the method by which employers effectively solicit employees’ con- 
cerns and, where it is appropriate, include them in the decision-making. 
It is typical that negotiated agreements contain specific provision for 
committees to work on subjects of health and safety and position classi- 
fication. Some contracts provide for the formation of a general commit- 
tee with sweeping responsibilities limited only by an understanding 
that contract interpretation and pending grievances are forbidden sub- 
jects. These committees can be productive vehicles for solving problems 
and addressing contentious issues before they become problems. They 
may generate a cooperative approach to shared concerns, assuming 
their processes do not deteriorate into institutionalized value bashing, 
and successfully ameliorate the traditional adversarial relationship 
between employees and management in the public library. 
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